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In Kisor v. Wilkie, the Supreme Court will soon consider whether to overrule
a significant administrative law doctrine governing a standard of judicial review
in which a reviewing court grants deference to an agency’s reasonable, although
not necessarily best, interpretation of one of its own regulations.2 The Court
should, instead, consider replacing the administrative law doctrine, Auer
deference, with Seminole Rock deference.3 However, the deference doctrines
* John B. Meisel, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville.The author wishes to thank the editors and the staff of the Catholic University
Journal of Law and Technology for their excellent editorial assistance.
The title is adapted from the widely-cited article: Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long
Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (2015).
2
Kisor v. Wilkie, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 6439837
(Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15) (On granting certiorari to reconsider overruling judicial
deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations).
3
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997) (establishing the Auer doctrine);
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) (establishing that using
binding deference to hold that when a case “involves an interpretation of an administrative
regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation
if the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution
in some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various
1
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are commonly used interchangeably.4 Indeed, in some ways, the 21st century
application of Auer deference, by incorporating a number of limitations on
binding deference, is better aligned with the original understanding and
application of Seminole Rock deference established in 1945.5 This is a step in
the correct direction. Notwithstanding this doctrinal improvement, the Supreme
Court has the opportunity to return the deference standard to its original
meaning, a form of deference much less generous to agency regulatory
interpretations while ensuring that a reviewing court has the final authority to
determine the legal commands an agency is instructed to follow, whether by
statute or in its own regulation.
There is growing dissatisfaction with deference doctrines in general, however
particularly with Auer deference.6 The legal community was surprised by the
late Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell
Telephone Co., in which he first criticized Auer deference, despite the fact that
Justice Scalia originally authored the opinion in Auer v. Robbins, which
entrenched the modern version of Auer deference granting generous deference
to agency interpretations of their own regulations.7 Apparently, Justice Scalia
was persuaded that judicial deference was no longer justified, in part, since it
violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers.8 In Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Association, each of the concurrences expressed great
skepticism for the Court’s practice of granting generous deference to regulatory
interpretations.9 However, a majority of the Justices remained confident that
there remains sufficient judicial control over agency regulatory interpretations
interpretations, but the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes
of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”).
4
Kiser v. Wilkie, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 6439837
(Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15) (granting certiorari limited to the first question as to whether
the Supreme Court should overrule Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., which directs courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own
ambiguous regulation.).
5
The Seminole Rock deference states that “the ultimate criterion is the administrative
interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414.
6
Daniel Waters, The Empty Case for Overruling Auer Deference, THE REG. REV. (Dec.
11, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/12/11/walters-empty-case-overruling-auerdeference; see also Aaron Nelson et al., Reflections on Seminole Rock: The Past, Present,
and Future of Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, YALE J. OF REG. AND THE
AM. B. ASS’N SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW & REG. PRAC. at 11, 20, 26 (2017)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2847668.
7
Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67-68 (2011)
(Scalia, J., Concurring).
8
Id. at 68.
9
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210-11, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
Alito, J., and Thomas, J., concurring).
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notwithstanding Auer deference.10
It has been speculated that the interest in reexamining Auer deference was on
the wane due to the death of Justice Scalia11 and the Court’s denial of certiorari
to review Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., where the district court relied
on Auer deference.12 However, with the appointment of two new Justices, Justice
Neil Gorsuch and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, and the granting of certiorari in
Kisor v. Wilkie, interest in examining Auer deference is rekindled.13 Both of
these new Justices have authored scholarship and opinions indicating concern
about the constitutionality of judicial reliance on deference doctrines.14
Part I of this Comment will present the theoretical model granting binding
deference to an agency’s statutory interpretations. This part will focus on the
assumptions that underlie the model and identifies the merits of an emerging
restriction on a grant of binding deference regarding the kinds of arguments an
agency uses to justify its interpretive choice. Part II presents the model granting
binding deference to an agency’s regulatory interpretations. It will show that
although this model is considered to be a rather simple extension of the statutory
interpretation model, such an extension has no theoretical justification. It is
critically important for a theoretical model underlying a deference doctrine to
distinguish cases in which an agency purports to make new law in a gap in a
legal text from those in which the agency is merely clarifying the inherent
meaning of a static text. Finally, Part III argues how the Court’s treatment of
agency regulatory interpretations in the seminal regulatory interpretation case,
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., is the proper model for judicial review of
an agency regulatory interpretation. This part will emphasize that the Seminole
Rock model of deference is fundamentally different from the premises
underlying Auer deference.

10 Id. 1225 n.4 (arguing that “[e]ven in cases where an agency’s interpretation receives
Auer deference, however, it is the court that ultimately decides whether a given
interpretation means what the agency says it means. Moreover, Auer deference is not an
inexorable command in all cases.”).
11 Kevin O. Leske, A Rock Unturned: Justice Scalia’s (Unfinished) Crusade Against the
Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017).
12 Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3d 839, 841-42 (7th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016).
13 Kisor v. Wilkie, 869 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 6439837
(Dec. 10, 2018) (No. 18-15); see also Walters, supra note 6, at 116-17.
14 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2134-44 (2016) (suggesting a new approach to determine whether the text of a statute is
clear which if implemented would impose a new limit on Chevron deference); see also
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151-52 (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(arguing Chevron deference requires a court to relinquish its constitutional power to say
“what the law is” to an agency’s (reasonable) statutory interpretation).
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I. CHEVRON DEFERENCE AS A MODEL FOR AUER DEFERENCE.
A. Chevron Framework as Promulgated by the Supreme Court
Auer deference, which concerns judicial review of agency regulatory
interpretations, is applied and justified in many ways similar to judicial review
of agency statutory interpretations. It is important first to understand the
administrative law and key assumptions underlying judicial review of agency
interpretations of statutory language before turning to the modern understanding
of Auer deference. The landmark Supreme Court case, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. provides the foundation and initial
theoretical background and justifications for binding deference to agency
statutory interpretations.15 The Chevron theoretical framework contains two
procedural steps. First, it is the court’s responsibility to determine if the statute
provided an unambiguous answer to the precise question at issue. For instance,
in the Chevron case, the question at issue was whether the statute clearly defined
the term ‘stationary source.’16 If, as in the Chevron case, the reviewing court
concludes Congress did not provide a clear answer, the statute (more
specifically, the term ‘stationary source’) was determined to be ambiguous.17 A
statute is deemed ambiguous if there is a gap or hole in the statute, or the statute
is silent regarding the specific question at issue.18
Given a finding of ambiguity (which implicitly captures silence in the statute
as well), court review moves beyond step one.19 The second prong presumes
Congress delegated the authority to resolve the statutory ambiguity to the
administering agency as long as the court determined that the agency’s statutory
interpretive choice was reasonable.20 The Chevron decision specifically stated:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which
it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
Id. at 840.
17 Id. at 843.
18 Id. at 843-44.
19 As described below, as the Chevron framework evolved, the reviewing court, before
moving to step two, holds ultimate power to determine whether there has been an implicit
delegation of interpretive power by Congress to the agency. Id. at 843-44.
20 Id.
15
16

2019]

Auer Deference Should Be Dead; Long Live Seminole Rock

77

question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction
of
the
statute.21
Under the Chevron framework, the key distinction is to determine whether
the source of the law derives from Congress or from the agency before the court
may decide how to allocate interpretive power.22 The Court has ultimate
interpretive power to discern the congressional intent written into the statute.23
While the agency can be an interpretive aid to help the Court identify
congressionally-made decisions, the ultimate interpretive authority resides with
the court.24 Accordingly, if the Court does not surpass Chevron step one, then
an agency does not possess binding interpretive authority regarding a decision
that Congress has already made in the statute.25
In step two of the Chevron analysis, when Congress has not made specific
statutory law on the precise question at issue (as it did not in the Chevron case
with respect to the definition of ‘stationary source’), the agency is delegated the
responsibility to supply the law. The agency will typically provide the law in the
form of a statutory interpretation embodied in a policy regulation to fill the
statutory gap.26 Although, the restrictive language in Chevron step one requires
Congress to provide the answer to the precise question at issue, the reviewing
court may circumvent a statutory command if it is not easily discernable, which
facilitates an analysis under Chevron step two, transferring interpretive power to
an agency.27 This has led to a fundamental concern with the use of Chevron
Id. at 842-43.
See id. at 842, 844, 865-66.
23 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984);
Conor Clarke, The Uneasy Case Against Auer and Seminole Rock, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 175, 180 (2014).
24 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
25 Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 200-01, 232 (1992) (stating “Congress never implicitly
delegated the authority to make binding interpretations of what Congress had in mind; that
interpretive task remains for the courts. Congress does and can delegate the authority to
make binding rules where it has not made them. That legislative task must be left to the
agencies.”); An exception to this principle is if Congress expressly delegated in the statute
binding interpretive authority to an agency. See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 192-93
(1992).
26 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44.
27 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 460 (1989) (stating “Chevron’s language so
narrowly circumscribed the judicial function in statutory interpretation that it was difficult,
21
22
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deference in that an agency could gain lawmaking power to decide what the law
is. This is especially problematic when Congress has already created the law on
the question at issue,28 although not in a precise fashion.29
If Congress had decided the question at issue (and it will be argued that a
congressionally-made decision should not be limited to resolving only precisely
expressed commands), ultimate interpretive power stays with the reviewing
court. The agency’s statutory interpretation only serves as an input into the
court’s responsibility to produce a statutory interpretation.30 The reviewing court
retains responsibility to discern the congressional decision, even in the case of
ambiguity, but not indeterminateness, in the statute.31 Otherwise, in such a case,
the move to step two was incorrect. In short, courts retain binding interpretive
power to resolve questions of law that can be resolved by legal analysis, whereas
agencies have delegated binding control over questions of policy that can be
resolved using legislative-type skills.32 As well as understanding the nature of
the skill required to resolve an interpretive question, there are other implications
of the Chevron framework which can be instructive for the subsequent
examination of theoretical and practical problems with modern Auer deference.
B. Evolution of Chevron Deference into the Auer Deference
It is appropriate and necessary that a doctrine that grants binding deference to
an agency’s interpretation of a statute is grounded in a legal explanation because
binding deference to an agency’s interpretation “marks a departure from the

at first, to believe Justice Steven’s opinion could be taken literally. Deference, Chevron
seems to say, means accepting any rational meaning the agency chooses to assign to the
statute unless the court can find not only that Congress had addressed “the precise question
at issue,” but also that it had spoken “directly,” to provide a “clear,” “unambiguously
expressed” answer.”).
28 Bob Goodlatte, Presidential power grabs distort democracy: Goodlatte, USA TODAY
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/01/presidential-powergrabs-executive-overreach-distort-democracy-congress-should-stop-goodlatte/79643162.
29 It is common to refer to the power transferred to an agency when Congress has not
made law as interpretive power. It is more appropriate to refer to the kind of power
transferred to the agency as lawmaking power since an agency is acting as a delegate of
Congress to perform a legislative task, with the court retaining interpretive power which is a
judicial duty to elucidate decisions that Congress has already made in the statute. Jonathan
R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 963-65
(2018) (explaining the distinction between interpretive power and lawmaking power).
30 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44; David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis
of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 336 (2000).
31 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44.
32 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1224 (2015); Hasen, supra note 30,
at 332-33.
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courts’ normal approach to resolving questions of statutory meaning.”33 That is,
“[o]rdinarily, to decide a case when an agency is not in the picture, a court would
seek to give its own best interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”34 The
theoretical framework that supplies the legitimacy and rationales for the
Chevron framework has been the subject of continuous critical discussion and
improvement.
In general, a theoretical model is built on a set of assumptions. First, it is
assumed that Congress possesses the legal authority to allocate discretionary
authority to create law when a statute is ambiguous or silent either to an
administrative agency under the executive branch, or an Article III federal
court.35 However, if the objective of an interpretation of a statute is to discern
law that Congress has already made, the reviewing court possesses ultimate
interpretive authority.
Second, Congress is assumed to delegate lawmaking power to an agency to
resolve statutory ambiguity.36 The decision to identify an administrative agency
as the entity with authority to resolve statutory ambiguity is based on a
conception of the term “interpretation” meaning that resolution of statutory
ambiguity requires the congressional delegate to fill gaps through public
policy.37 When a term or phrase in a statute is deemed ambiguous, it is the
responsibility of the administrative agency to promulgate the law.38
An agency is comparatively superior in two ways to a court in making policy
decisions, which become regulatory law, equal in force to statutory law.39 First,
an agency possesses superior subject matter expertise. An agency can draw on
Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. L. REV. 1339, 1382 (2017).
Id. at 1347.
35 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, GEO. L.J., (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15)
(available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225880) (explaining that it is conventional
legal analysis that whether courts should defer to agency interpretations of law is a question
for Congress to decide (subject to constitutional limitations)).
36 Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1996) (explaining Chevron deference is
based on “a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”).
37 Jeff Pojanowski, Showdown in the Supreme Court over Administrative
Interpretations of Regulations, YALE J. ON REG. (Oct. 1, 2014), http://yalejreg.com/
showdown-in-the-supreme-court-over-administrative-interpretations-of-regulations-by-jeffpojanowski/ (“A major premise governing contemporary judicial review of agency
interpretations is that the line between interpretation and lawmaking is often illusory. That,
much administrative law and scholarship tells us, is why we have Chevron deference when
statutes are unclear: an interpreter makes law in statutory gaps and agencies should make
these policy choices, not courts.”).
38 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
39 E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles
of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 14 (2005).
33
34
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the expertise of engineers, economists, public policy experts, lawyers, and other
staff trained in specialized policymaking fields within the administrative agency
to conduct rigorous analytical studies of alternative policy solutions to the
problems specifically or generally identified by Congress in the statute but for
which Congress, for various reasons, did not resolve.40
Secondly, an agency is located in a politically accountable branch of
government that is structured in a manner to be responsive to the demands of the
public and, especially, the President. This ties Chevron’s decision regarding the
allocation of interpretive authority to make policy decisions to the democratic
principle that policy decisions should reside with the politically accountable
branches of government.41 These “considerations [reasons], however, cannot
provide independent legal justifications for Chevron deference as much as they
reinforce the wisdom of judicial recognition in appropriate circumstances of an
implicit delegation to ‘the agency charged with the administration of the
statute.’”42 In short, the most cogent justification for Chevron deference is based
on an assumption that it is a command from Congress.43
Under the Chevron framework, the reviewing court retains three forms of
interpretive power in the sense of ultimate responsibility for discerning the
decisions that Congress did make in the statute. First, in step one of the Chevron
analysis, courts retain ultimate power to decide if Congress clearly resolved the
precise statutory question at issue.44 Second, if the statute is deemed ambiguous,

40 Id. at 14 (quoting Mr. Elliott, who drew on his experience as EPA General Counsel
starting in 1989, to provide real world evidence for how Chevron caused changes in the
dynamics inside agencies as saying “[o]ne result of the Chevron induced shift of power to
agencies within the Executive Branch, as mentioned earlier, is that agency experts are
making more policy decisions rather than agency lawyers and federal courts.”).
41 This principle also means that when Congress did make a policy decision in the
statute, that instruction must be followed and not usurped by an agency’s decision.
42 Coglianese, supra note 33, at 1348 n. 42 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)).
43 This article accepts the correctness of this assumption but recognizes that there are
compelling arguments that question the constitutional basis of the assumption. For example,
Farina, argues that Chevron deference is “fundamentally incongruous” with the
constitutional accommodation that permitted the delegation of legislative power to agencies.
In return for allowing such delegations, the power to say what the statute means must rest
with the courts. Thus, Chevron deference is at odds with the nondelegation doctrine. Farina,
supra note 27, at 498; Among others, Justice Thomas, argues that Chevron deference is a
violation of Article III because courts are assigned the power to say what the law is, or
interpretive power. As is explained below, the type of power that Congress delegates to an
agency is lawmaking power, not purely interpretive power. Justice Thomas’ contention
would be supported if, instead, agencies exercised delegated lawmaking power to merely
explain what Congress had already decided in the statute. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
44 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 842-43 (1984).
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the court also retains ultimate power at step two of the Chevron analysis, to
determine the set of interpretations that would satisfy the requirement of a
reasonable interpretation.45 Third, as the Chevron framework matured, it became
clear that not all agency interpretations are eligible for deference.46 That is,
statutory ambiguity is a necessary condition to move to Chevron step two, but it
is not a sufficient condition.47 Given an ambiguity in the statutory provision at
issue, the reviewing court retains ultimate authority to determine if Congress
implicitly delegated lawmaking power to the agency.48 In essence, the court
must decide if a move to a step two analysis where the agency holds categorical
lawmaking power is the appropriate step to resolve the specific ambiguity at
issue.
The Court has identified several requirements as to whether the agency has
been delegated lawmaking power implicitly to resolve the statutory ambiguity
at issue. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court held that when an agency has
been delegated lawmaking power and has exercised that power when it
45 The set of reasonable interpretations has been described, according to a prominent
administrative law scholar, as Chevron space. Strauss contends “‘Chevron space’ denotes
the area within which an administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a
manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—-that is, its legally delegated or
allocated authority.” The agency is free to select from among the reasonable interpretations
and, if factual or political circumstances change, to change from one reasonable
interpretation to another. Peter L. Strauss, Deference is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them
Chevron Space and Skidmore Weight, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012).
46 Bradley George Hubbard, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First
Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. OF CHI. L.
REV. 447, 476 n.165 (2013); Two types of deference, categorical and epistemological, are
implicated in the article. An agency interpretation is granted categorical deference (in the
text, also, called binding or ultimate deference) if the reviewing court must accept the
agency interpretation if the court determines it to be reasonable even if the court would have
chosen a different interpretation if it instead held ultimate authority. An agency
interpretation is granted epistemological deference (commonly referred to as Skidmore
deference) if the reviewing court finds the agency’s interpretation to be persuasive and
adopts the agency interpretation as its own. Persuasiveness is considered a more demanding
standard of judicial review than reasonableness. If a court is using the Skidmore standard of
review, the court holds ultimate interpretive power. At Chevron step one, the court can grant
epistemological deference to an agency interpretation, but the court holds ultimate
interpretive power. At Chevron step two, the agency holds binding interpretive/lawmaking
power if the interpretive choice lies in Chevron space. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
47 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S at 842-43.
48 Hubbard, supra note 46, at 457. The stage in which a reviewing court determines if
the agency has been delegated implicitly lawmaking power is an interstitial step. According
to Coglianese, the Chevron framework conceives of this decision as occurring after the
court’s step one decision regarding ambiguity, and before the step two decision to consider
granting categorical deference to the agency’s statutory interpretation. Coglianese, supra
note 33, at 1361-62. Other scholars refer to these interstitial decisions as occurring at
Chevron step zero. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain,
89 GEO. L.J. 833, 837 (2001).
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formulated its statutory interpretation, the interpretation has the legal force of a
statute and should be granted categorical deference.49 Accordingly, if Congress
intends for an agency to make law to fill gaps in a statute, Congress must first
delegate the lawmaking power to the agency. The agency then must have
exercised that power to make law, in a fashion that exhibits fairness and
deliberation as does the manner in which Congress exercises its lawmaking
power.50 Unfortunately, the Mead decision failed to clarify when the Court
should find an implicit congressional delegation of lawmaking power.51
The Court has identified other circumstances in which an implicit delegation
of lawmaking power should not be inferred from mere ambiguity in a statute.52
These examples represent circumstances when it seems unlikely that Congress
intended to delegate lawmaking power to an agency to make law by resolving a
statutory ambiguity. For instance, in King v Burwell,53 the Court did not find an
implicit delegation for two reasons, even though the Court determined the
statutory provision at issue was determined to be ambiguous and the agency had
utilized the notice-and-comment rulemaking process to produce the statutory
interpretation. First, the statutory question at issue was considered to be too
important in the sense of implicating significant social and economic effects to
be left for resolution by an agency without an express delegation from
49 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 S. Ct. 218, 226-27 (2000) (A court should move to
step two “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.”).
50 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230; Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843.
51 See Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1040 (2005) (“[T]he case did send a clear signal that the Court
expects that interpretations produced through either notice-and-comment or formal
adjudication will typically enjoy the “force of law.”“); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
222 (2002) (showing how only one year elapsed before the Court granted categorical
deference to an agency’s informally produced statutory interpretation explaining that its
longstanding status served as an independent ground for such deference); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1443, 1477-78 (2005) (arguing that Mead created confusion among the lower courts in their
efforts to ascertain the circumstances in which Congress intended to implicitly delegate
lawmaking power to agencies).
52 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000); Hasen,
supra note 30, at 350 n.113; see, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers v. U.S. Dept. of
Transp., 840 F.3d 879, 888 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating how the petitioner reading a single word
in isolation ignores the whole statute, which is contrary to what the Supreme Court has
held); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F.Supp.3d 165, 188, (D.D.C. 2016)
(reasoning that the defendant’s argument that they deserve deference pursuant to their
interpretation of 31 USC § 1324 fails).
53 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme
Court chose not to find an implicit delegation despite ambiguity after relying on principles
of statutory interpretation and Congressional intent).
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Congress.54 Interestingly, if the reviewing court instead found an implicit
delegation of lawmaking power, it would grant an agency the authority to change
the regulatorily-made law in the future as policy decisions should respond to
changing factual circumstances and changes in political administrations.
Delegating authority to an agency to make law is also accompanied by the
authority to change that law.55
Second, the Court determined it was not appropriate for the agency to resolve
such an issue since it lacked the necessary policymaking expertise.56 These are
some of the factors that the reviewing court will consider when determining
whether there has been an implicit delegation of lawmaking power to the agency.
It is evident that the reviewing court holds ultimate power to decide if Congress
intended implicitly to delegate to an agency the power to resolve authoritatively
the statutory ambiguity.57
Suppose that the reviewing court has determined that the statute is ambiguous,
and that Congress intended implicitly to delegate lawmaking power to the
agency. The nature and extent of judicial scrutiny at Chevron step two to
determine if an agency’s interpretation warrants categorical deference is a
question in a state of flux.58 Recall, the legal theory that underlies Chevron is

Id.
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting In On The Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2359, 2417 n. 355 (2018) (“A second response hinges on the particular political
stakes—namely that upholding the Act on Chevron grounds, giving deference to the IRS’s
interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, would mean that the Act would be
susceptible to political unraveling down the road, should the IRS change its interpretation in
a new administration. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts raised this concern [during the] oral
argument [of King v. Burwell].”) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114)).
56 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (explaining how the Court found the IRS wasn’t the
appropriate agency to decide the relevant issue given its lack of expertise in crafting health
insurance policy).
57 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 n.9 (1984);
FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981).
58 Compare Herz, supra note 1, at 1885 (explaining how at Chevron step two, “the
agency is no longer on the court’s turf, the court is on the agency’s” and thus there is little
room for judicial scrutiny), with King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488-89 (discussing how in
extraordinary cases, judicial scrutiny may be required to limit deference under Chevron step
two), and Asher Steinberg, Encino Motorcars, Cuozzo, and the Impossible Dream of Step
Two Arbitrary and Capricious Review, THE NARROWEST GROUNDS (June 29, 2016),
http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2016/06/encino-motorcars-cuozzo-andimpossible.html (explaining that at step two, interpretive reasonableness should not suffice
for a court to hold that an agency’s statutory interpretive choice deserves categorical
deference. Furthermore, interpretive reasonableness supported by an agency’s legal
justification for what it determined to be the intention of Congress should also fail the step
two test. To warrant Chevron deference, an agency needs to satisfy both an interpretive
reasonableness standard and a rigorous reason-giving requirement in which the agency
supplies empirical and policy-based reasons for its interpretive choice).
54
55
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that deference is warranted because Congress has implicitly delegated
lawmaking power to an agency to make law to fill gaps in a statute.59 That is, an
agency is expected to resolve a statutory ambiguity by making law since the gap
represents the absence of congressionally-made law on the issue.60
Questions of interest that apply to both Chevron and Auer deference center
upon: (1) distinguishing the mode of reasoning an agency uses to justify its
interpretive choice and; (2) whether the kind, or mode of reasoning should be a
factor in deciding whether a court grants categorical deference. First, it is
important to distinguish the mode of reasoning an agency uses to justify its
interpretive choice.61 One mode of reasoning is prescriptive reasoning. This is
when “an agency exercises its discretion to implement a legislative directive by
weighing evidence, utilizing technical expertise, and making policy choices.”62
This mode of reasoning is consistent with Chevron’s underlying theory that
assumes that an agency is using its delegated authority to fill gaps in statutory
law. This requires an agency to utilize its subject matter expertise and
policymaking skills to make legislative-type judgments (reflecting the values of
the current Administration) which serve to justify its interpretive choice.
A second, different mode of reasoning is called expository reasoning. This
mode of reasoning is when an agency attempts to determine, “what Congress
actually intended with respect to a particular issue or what the relevant judicial
precedents dictate the proper answer to be.”63 The agency subordinates its
authority to what legal texts instruct it to decide. Essentially, an agency is
performing a judicial task by approaching the problem with a neutral and
dispassionate mind-set, free from political considerations to determine the
meaning inherent of a statute or regulation.
However, when an agency relies on prescriptive reasoning, it is making law.
Whereas, when an agency relies on expository reasoning, it is making a
statement about what the meaning of the law is.64 It is a logical extension of the
distinction between these modes of reasoning to conceive of the Chevron
framework as demanding the use of expository reasoning at step one and
prescriptive reasoning at step two.65 That is, in the presence of statutory
59 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44; Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 17 (1990).
60 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843-44.
61 Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV.
112, 115 (2011) (describing how an agency’s chosen mode of reasoning is an
underappreciated feature of agency action and the different modes of reasoning an agency
may use to justify a change in its action).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 117.
64 Id. at 141-42.
65 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 n. 9
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ambiguity, deference is warranted when an agency selects a statutory
interpretation based on its lawmaking skills and explains its interpretive choice
using prescriptive reasoning. Comparatively, if the agency relies on expository
reasons during step two of the analysis, it is making its interpretive choice to
coincide with what it determines to be the interpretation that Congress intended,
rather than filling gaps in a statute when Congress had no intention regarding
the issue at question. The agency’s interpretive choice may be a valuable source
for understanding what Congress intended to decide in the statute, but it does
not warrant categorical defense based on the theory that underlies the Chevron
framework.
At Chevron step two, an agency’s interpretive choice must fall within the
parameters set forth in Chevron, which are the set of permissible interpretations,
as determined by the reviewing court.66 But, to earn categorical deference, the
agency should be asked to do more.67 The reviewing court must not only ensure
that the agency’s interpretive choice falls within Chevron space but it must also
ensure that the agency’s exercise of its discretion within Chevron space is not
arbitrary and capricious.68 The Court should consider the reasons an agency
provides for its interpretive choice to determine if deference is appropriate. On
one hand, an agency that offers expository reasons for its choice, even though it
may have used a formal procedure such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, it
in effect, offered an interpretive rule for the statute.69 That is, the agency’s legal
reasoning merely clarified what Congress intended an ambiguous term to mean
even though the reviewing court at step one had concluded that the statute was
ambiguous. Apparently, in the agency’s view, the statute was ambiguous but not
(1984) (Courts are instructed to use the “traditional tools of statutory interpretation” to
ascertain congressional intent at step one).
66 Id. at 843-44.
67 Sharkey, supra note 55, at 2371-85 (identifying several cases in which a reviewing
court grants categorical deference for an agency’s statutory interpretation that falls within
the Chevron space, but the agency offers either a minimally reasonable explanation for its
choice or a legal justification for its interpretive choice. This article agrees with Professor
Sharkey that such an approach to step two is not consistent with the underlying assumptions
of the Chevron framework, that incorporates a reasoned decision-making requirement for its
interpretive/policy decision).
68 Peter L. Strauss, Deference is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them Chevron Space and
Skidmore Weight, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 9, 9 (2012).
69 Sharkey, supra note 55, at 2372 (analyzing a water-pollution case, Catskill Mountains
Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, involving contrary deference decisions of a district
court and the circuit court, the author concludes that the circuit court’s decision to grant
deference to the agency’s interpretation (overturning the district court) was in error: “What
is missing from the EPA’s legal exegesis is any fact finding, critical analysis, or even
explicit acknowledgement of any underlying policy considerations embedded in what is
essentially an interpretive rule.” In short, the circuit court incorrectly granted categorical
deference for a statutory interpretation that was justified using expository reasoning. This
type of agency reasoning only warrants less deferential Skidmore deference).
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indeterminate.70 In fact, in reality, the agency made a step one decision under
the umbrella of a step two analysis. It is clear, under the legal foundation of
Chevron, that the reviewing court holds interpretive power in step one decisions
and categorical deference for an agency’s statutory interpretation is
unwarranted. It is likely that some ambiguity in a statute can be resolved
satisfactorily by the court’s ultimate determination.71
On the other hand, when a reviewing court determines whether the agency’s
statutory interpretation is a reasonable choice it should demand that an agency
demonstrate prescriptive reasoning for its choice. The prescriptive reasons
should describe how the agency utilized its subject matter expertise and political
judgments to make law when there is a gap left by the statute. Expository
reasoning should not suffice for it is not intended to fill a gap but merely to
clarify existing law.72 It is time for courts to distinguish, in a case of statutory
ambiguity, between agency efforts to determine the law that Congress intended
to make from those efforts to make law in gaps in the statute. As Steinberg
persuasively argues,
32 years after Chevron was decided, the Court still doesn’t
understand—or understands but refuses to admit—that there are no
good reasons for mandatory [categorical] deference (as opposed to
contingent Skidmore deference) to agency regulations that adopt a
particular interpretation of a statute because the agency says the
statute is textually best read that way. 32 years after Chevron was
decided, the Court still doesn’t understand—or understands but
refuses to admit—that Chevron only gives agencies deference on the
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 859-61 (1984).
It is recognized that this point runs contrary to the current understanding of
administrative law that rejects the interpretation versus policymaking distinction. See
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1089-90 (2016) (the thrust
of this article is that such a distinction is both coherent and judicially manageable and that
“It would represent a triumph of classical, pre-legalist thought that, while aware of the
blurriness in the lines between making, executing, and interpreting law, nevertheless insists
that the division of these activities was coherent in theory and estimable in practice.”).
72 Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 61, at 153-54 (explaining the Kozel and Pojanowski
model assumes that expository factors that determine the meaning of existing law are
distinct from prescriptive factors that enable an agency to make new law. The authors
respond to the argument that their model is too simplistic and that, in reality, “… the process
of exposition necessarily entails consideration of factors such as optimal policy and political
preferences.” The authors provide persuasive rebuttals to this argument. For instance, they
(at 154) argue, “even if some ambiguity exists, it is erroneously reductive to assume that the
only recourse is application of policy preferences. Disputes over statutory meaning or the
trajectory of judicial precedent are more nuanced than that. To be sure, some statutory
provisions contain phrases (for example, “in the public interest”) that invite prescriptive
policy choices. But in many cases considerations of text, structure, and purpose will suggest
a best reading exogenous to the decisionmaker’s ideology.”).
70
71
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premise and condition that they do not interpret statutes that way, but
instead make policy choices that call on expertise, public opinion,
and presidential preferences.73
Consistent with the modern conception of interpretation that if the line
between interpretation and policymaking is blurry, courts face significant
difficulty when determining whether the agency’s interpretation is explaining
existing law or making new law.74 One way to distinguish between the two
modes of reasoning is for the court to examine the reasons an agency gives for
its statutory interpretation. The reviewing court should determine whether the
agency’s reasoning analysis relied on legal interpretation skills (such as reliance
on textual analysis, legislative history, the overall structure and purposes of the
statutory scheme) or by the use of its subject matter expertise (such as use of
cost-benefit analysis and fact-finding) and political judgments. That is, a court
is fully capable of assessing the type of reasoning an agency utilized to defend
its statutory interpretation unless one subscribes to the view that all statutory
interpretation, regardless of the reasoning utilized, is a function of
policymaking.75 But that view of interpretation, paradoxically, is inconsistent
with the two-step method implementing the Chevron framework.
Chevron distinguishes between the judicial function, exercised by courts at
step one and an agency’s legislative-like function, exercised when it makes law
at step two.76 In addition, a court can look to what the agency says its
interpretation is doing. Does it say, when justifying its statutory interpretation,
that it found what Congress intended to be the best policy in the statute or what
judicial precedents required it to do? If so, this is a sign that it likely engaged
expository reasoning for which categorical deference is not warranted.77
Steinberg, supra note 58.
Id. (describing an interesting exchange during oral argument in the case of Encino
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) between a participating lawyer and
Justice Kagan in which the Justice admits that the Court has not taken into consideration for
the deference decision at step two the reasons the agency uses to justify its interpretation.
Specifically, categorical deference has been granted when the agency merely says that its
interpretation is justified because that is how the agency read the statute. Reading a statute
would indicate that the agency has not made new law but merely found existing law).
75 See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 61, at 142.
76 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(describing that “if the statue is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute”).
77 Steinberg, supra note 58 (arguing “[a]nd while a distinction between purely
interpretive and policy reasoning might be unadministrable, the proper distinction between
agencies that profess to say what Congress meant and agencies that profess to be making
policy decisions is probably much easier to draw.”); see also Herz, supra note 25, at 187,
200-01, 229-30, 232 (1992) (“Indeed, absent express delegation of interpretive authority,
whenever an agency says, explicitly or implicitly, “we think Congress intended...,” its
conclusion must be reviewed under step one. What Congress intended is a question for the
73
74
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II. AUER DEFERENCE AS AN EXTENSION OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE.
A. Resolution of the tension between interpretation under Chevron Deference
and the Administrative Procedure Act
The approach to Chevron step two analysis emphasizes the conceptual and
practical differences, as revealed in judicial precedents and legislative action
such as the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), between a legislative rule
and an interpretive rule.78 That is, there is a difference between an agency’s
statutory interpretation that makes law, by the creation of new rights, duties, or
responsibilities, and an interpretation that clarifies existing law. But how can this
distinction be reconciled with Chevron’s assumption that policymaking and
interpretation are indistinguishable?79 The tension between the Chevron and the
APA conception of interpretation is apparent in the Supreme Court case, Perez
v. Mortgage Bankers Association.80
The dispute involved a D.C. Circuit rule that required any administrative
agency that changed a definitive interpretation of a regulation, to use notice-andcomment rulemaking for the new interpretation.81 The Paralyzed Veterans
Doctrine arose from concern on the part of the D.C. Circuit court that it was too
courts. It may be that the agency is wrong, and Congress had no intent, but that is for the
court to decide.”).
78 Perez v. Mort. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203-04 (“The Administrative Act
(APA) establishes the procedures federal administrative agencies use for “rule making,”
defined as the process of “formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” The APA
distinguishes between two types of rules: So-called “legislative rules” are issued through
notice-and-comment rulemaking and have the “force and effect of law.” “Interpretive rules,”
by contrast, are “issued . . . to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes
and rules which it administers,” do not require notice-and-comment rulemaking, and “do not
have the force and effect of law,”) (citations omitted).
79 Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 61, at 151 (supporting the idea that there are real,
underappreciated differences between interpretation and policymaking in Chevron although
it is common to conclude that the framework is based on the assumption that it is not
possible to distinguish interpretation from policymaking. More accurately, under Chevron,
pure interpretation remains within the authority of the courts to determine all law that
Congress has made in the statute whereas policymaking is a result of a congressional
command to delegate to an agency the law-making authority to make law when there is a
gap in statutory law. “While Chevron is most famous for linking policymaking discretion
with the resolution of textual ambiguity, another notable feature of the case is its affirmation
of how the meaning of legal texts define and cabin administrative discretion.”).
80 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1205 (explaining that a change in the Department of Labor’s
interpretation of one of its regulation is an interpretive rule that, of course, was not the result
of a notice-and-comment rulemaking. The new interpretation concluded that mortgage-loan
officers were eligible for overtime compensation).
81 See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587-88 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (creating the new judge-made rule referred to as the Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine).
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easy for an agency to flip-flop on an issue that seemingly had been settled by a
prior agency interpretation so that the prior interpretation had effectively become
part of the law.82 Of particular concern was that there was no need to use any
type of formal process, there was a lack of required public comment, and a lack
of rigorous judicial review of the change.
The D.C. Circuit offered a procedural remedy to correct a problem
determining that there was no existing ex ante procedural check or ex post
judicial check on possible arbitrary agency action.83 If one subscribes to the
conceptual view that interpretation is policymaking, an ex-ante procedural rule
is appropriate for a new interpretation which creates new rights and duties that
should result from the use of a formal process. Under this conception of
interpretation, there is no difference between an interpretive rule and a
legislative rule. In either situation, the agency is filling a gap in an ambiguous
regulation just as in Chevron, where the agency is filling a gap in an ambiguous
statute.84 As such, when an agency changes an interpretation of a regulation it
is, in reality, creating new law.85 With such a view of interpretation, the
Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine seemed to make sense. However, the Court found
the judge-made doctrine to be inconsistent with APA procedural requirements.86
The Court’s unanimous holding, relying on the literal text of the APA,
maintained that there are distinguishing differences87 between a legislative rule
(creates law and requires a formal process) and an interpretive rule (clarifies
existing law and no need for a formal process). Since the rule in question was an

82 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (overturning Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C.
Arena in part and explaining that if the agency is flip-flopping on a legislative rule, then the
agency must undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking; however, does not need to use
informal rulemaking for interpretive rules); see Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586
(requiring federal agencies to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking when they
substantially altered an “interpretive” rule).
83 See Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586.
84 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
85 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203 (explaining that published interpretations do not have the
effect of law but are heavily relied upon by the public); FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009) (explaining that when an agency changes direction and
departs from a prior policy, it need not “provide detailed justification than would suffice for
a new policy created on a blank slate”); see Paralyzed Veterans of America, 117 F.3d at
586-87 (explaining that their holding applies to subsequent interpretive rules, but not
elaborating on whether agencies must undergo notice-and-comment for their initial
interpretive rule).
86 Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 584.
87 Herz, supra note 1, at 1881 (“the constitutional structure, the APA’s distinction
between legislative and interpretive rules, centuries of jurisprudence, and most people’s
intuitions accept a distinction between interpreting law and making law.”); Perez, 135 S. Ct.
at 1203-04 (relying on the literal text of the APA to draw a distinction between legislative
and interpretive rulemaking); Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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interpretive rule,88 APA requirements should be strictly followed, and
interpretive rules are unambiguously exempt from notice-and-comment.89
However, the underlying tension between the Chevron concept of interpretation
and the APA concept was not addressed.90
The Perez case was resolved as a rather simple case based on APA procedural
requirements, but the real fireworks were contained in the three concurrences
that raised a controversial issue not at question in the case.91 The concurrences,
while not questioning the Court’s decision to deny the authority of a lower court
to add a procedural requirement without congressional approval, focused on the
lack of strict judicial scrutiny of agency interpretations of their own regulations
that results in those rules having binding power on courts.92 When a court relies
on Auer deference, interpretive rules lack either ex ante procedural protections
or ex post rigorous judicial scrutiny. This implicates an administrative law
principle that is captured by the phrase: “pay me now or pay me later.”93 This
means that a more forgiving ex post judicial review standard, such as categorical
deference, is earned by an agency undertaking rigorous ex ante procedures, such
as notice-and-comment. However, when a rule is produced in a more informal
manner ex ante, it should be subject to a stricter ex post judicial review standard,
such as an epistemologically-based standard of review.94 The Paralyzed
Veterans Doctrine was ultimately an unsuccessful effort to apply this principle.

88 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203-04 (explaining the APA process for rule making and
interpretation); see Adam J. White, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers: Heralding the Demise of
Auer Deference?, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 333, 346-47 (2014-2015) (explaining that the
Court asserted that this view was subscribed to by both sides in the dispute, but one can
question this assertion).
89 Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203.
90 Pojanowski, supra note 37 (commenting on the D.C. Circuit’s rule before the
outcome of the Perez case stated “Or, if the D.C. Circuit is wrong [as it turned out to be],
and if the APA precludes notice-and-comment for modification of interpretive rules, that
could be because the APA assumes an understanding of interpretation that is quite less
policy-laden than the conventional wisdom in administrative law and scholarship.”).
91 See Perez,135 S. Ct. at 1210-25 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment; Scalia, J., concurring in judgment; and Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
92 Id. at 1212, 1224 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment; and Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment).
93 See Craig J. Duchossois Revocable Tr. v. CDX Labs., Inc., 495 F.Supp.2d 869, 871
(2006) (explaining phrase “pay me now or pay me later”); David Weyher, Pay Me Now or
Pay Me Later, SWEET PAY (Aug. 17, 2018), https://sweetwaytopay.com/2018/08/17/pay-menow-or-pay-me-later/ (explaining how phrase “pay me now, or pay me later” is relevant
across goods and services).
94 See White, supra note 88, at 354, 356.
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B. Auer Deference Improperly Transfers Law Interpretation Power to the
Executive Branch
Why would the Court create a deference doctrine that violated this
principle?95 To begin to understand the answer to the question, one must first
realize that, in many ways, today’s Auer deference is modelled after Chevron
deference. It has evolved into a doctrine that grants categorical deference to
agency interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations with some exceptions to
deference,96 just as Chevron grants categorical deference to an agency’s
statutory interpretation subject to some exceptions.97 However, the Auer
doctrine is not supported with its own theoretical model but instead has resorted
to explanations based on an assumption that an agency knows its rules better
than anyone else and its similarity to Chevron.98 In fact, proposals for
improvement in Auer often suggest that the limitations in Auer should be
modelled after those that apply for Chevron.99
Before further incremental improvements to the modern conception of Auer
should be considered, one must first consider whether there is legal justification
for a court to give binding deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation. There is no legal justification for a court to give categorical deference
to an agency’s interpretation of what an existing regulation means.100 Recall, in
95 See Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimov, The Court’s Deferences—-a Foolish
Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. NEWS 10, 11 (2000) (arguing that the APA contemplated
plenary judicial review of interpretive rules. Auer deference “contradicts the reason the
framers of the APA included an exception [to notice-and-comment] for interpretative rules
in Section 553; namely, that such rules are subject to “plenary judicial review.”); Herz,
supra note 25, at 213 n. 131 (“The Senate Report accompanying the Administrative
Procedure Act explained that notice and comment was unnecessary for interpretive rules
because these “rules”—as merely interpretations of statutory provisions –are subject to
plenary judicial review.” S. DOC. NO. 248, 79TH CONG., 2D SESS. 18 (1946)).
96 See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-67 (2012)
(showing that Auer Deference is not appropriate in all cases, for example, “when the
agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” “when there
is reason to suspect that the agency’s interpretation “does not reflect the agency’s fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question,” or “when it appears that the interpretation is
nothing more than a convenient litigating position, “ or “post-hoc rationalization.”).
97 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (suggesting that Chevron
should not apply when a “question of deep economic and political significance” is at issue
and Congress has not explicitly delegated authority to an agency to deal with the issue).
98 Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 90
(2018).
99 See, e.g., Brief of Professors—Dean Ronald A. Cass, Christopher C. Demuth, Sr., and
Christopher J. Walker—As Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 15-16, Gloucester
County School Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016), (No. 16-273) (arguing
among other things, that Auer should not only follow Chevron deference in its application to
agencies who have not clearly been given discretion but should be stricter in its application).
100 The one exception to this conclusion is if Congress gives the agency explicit authority
to make such an interpretive determination. However, there seems to be little legal
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Chevron, the Court provided that the power that Congress delegated to an
agency was power that it had been vested with pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution, that is, the power to make law.101 Although, the Chevron decision
labelled this as a delegation of interpretive power, it is more appropriately
considered a conferral of lawmaking power to fill gaps in statutory law.102
Congress did not delegate interpretive power granting an agency deference for
its understanding of the commands that Congress issued in the statute.
Furthermore, as with Chevron deference, it is not up to reviewing courts to
decide whether they should defer to an agency regulatory interpretation, it is
Congress’ decision.103
The basic premise of modern Auer deference is that when Congress delegates
lawmaking power to an administrative agency this includes a delegation of
interpretive power to the agency to say what its own regulations mean.104 There
are several flaws in this premise. First, one reason that Congress is permitted to
delegate lawmaking power to an agency is because it can directly control the
magnitude of the power delegated by how specifically it writes its statutory
commands and by inclusion of an intelligible principle to cabin the agency’s
discretion. The magnitude of an agency’s discretion is directly controlled by
Congress.105 No such argument can be made with respect to an indirect
delegation of authority. Congress has little control over the specificity an agency
uses when it writes a regulation.106 In fact, one of the complaints about Auer
deference is that the doctrine encourages an agency to write ambiguous
regulations to which it can subsequently add specificity in order to make real
policies by using interpretive rules (rules lacking either ex ante procedural or ex
justification for a court to find an implicit delegation of such interpretive authority.
101 Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
102 Siegel, supra note 29, at 964-65.
103 Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43.
104 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 680-81 (1992) (identifying how
the premise of Auer deference is inconsistent with a constitutional requirement that the
lawmaking and law interpretation functions should be controlled by separate branches of
government. Under this view, Chevron deference does not violate the constitutional
requirement because Congress writes the law that an agency interprets. In contrast, if a court
grants categorical deference to an agency interpretation of one of its own regulations, the
same entity is engaged in both functions); see also Peter M. Torstensen Jr., The Curious
Case of Seminole Rock: Revisiting Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of their
Ambiguous Regulations, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 817 (2015) (noting a common-sense
argument for Auer deference that “if Congress intends to have an agency resolve
ambiguities in a statute, surely [. . .] it intends for an agency to resolve ambiguities in its
own regulations.”).
105 Elliott, supra note 39, at 6-7.
106 Manning, supra note 104, at 662 (arguing that when agencies self-interpret vague
rules through adjudication, the efficacy of notice-and-comment rulemaking is reduced).
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post judicial protections for the public).107
Second, when Congress delegates lawmaking power to an agency, it is
reducing its own legislative power, while also increasing the power of the other
political branch of government.108 This alters the balance of power between the
two political branches. With Auer deference, the issue is not simply the transfer
of power but the enhancement of executive power since the agency retains power
to make regulations and adds interpretive power over its own ambiguous
regulations.109 This can potentially lead to a dangerous accumulation of power
in the executive branch.110
Third, in Chevron, Congress is directly delegating its power to a different
branch of government.111 In contrast, the Auer premise assumes that Congress’
delegation of lawmaking power implicitly includes a subsumed, indirect
delegation of power. This implies that the initial grant of authority from
Congress effectively assigns authority to an agency to delegate to itself
interpretive power over its own regulations.112 Self-delegation is not consistent
with the lawmaking authority that Congress can exercise or with the
constitutional imperative to separate the three branches of government. These
flaws were neither acknowledged nor addressed in Court decisions implicating
modern Auer deference until Justice Scalia began to call for reexamination of
the doctrine in 2011.113 It is now evident that the Auer premise is built on a shaky
foundation. The deference doctrine has been propped up with additional
limitations but still lacks a solid theoretical explanation.
Furthermore, proponents in favor of Congress delegating lawmaking power
to an agency to make law to fill gaps in statutory language, argue the agency
holds subject matter expertise and remains politically accountable. However,
these policies do not necessarily apply to the interpretation of an existing,
ambiguous regulation. According to the APA, an interpretive rule is not intended
to make a new policy choice but rather to clarify how the agency interprets a
Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 91.
Manning, supra note 104, at 654 (urging that if Congress does not specify policies
clearly during the process of bicameralism and presentment, it risks giving power to
another).
109 See White, supra note 88, at 334-35 (describing how agencies are unaccountable to
the ‘people’ yet make most of the federal law through their regulations or adjudications).
110 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (Alito, J., concurring)
(describing that Auer deference contributes to the increasing power of administrative
agencies).
111 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
112 See Brief of Professors, supra note 99, at 6 (“The discretionary authority granted to
the agency by law should not be seen as a “nested” grant of authority—-akin to a set of
Russian “matryoshka” dolls—-with each grant containing an implicit sub-grant of further
discretion…”).
113 Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
107
108
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regulation it has already promulgated.114 One would expect an agency to rely on
expository reasoning to justify its interpretive rule. If the agency is, in fact,
making new policy with an interpretive rule, then the agency is obligated to use
notice-and-comment and Auer deference is inapplicable.115 A signal that the
agency is making policy is if it relies on prescriptive reasoning for its
interpretation. A purported interpretative rule that, in reality, creates new policy
should be classified as a legislative rule, subject to the Chevron framework. In
other words, there is a fundamental difference between an agency creating new
policy in a gap in an ambiguous regulation and an agency clarifying an existing
regulation. An implicit delegation of lawmaking power to an agency to fill in
gaps in an ambiguous statute is rooted in a solid theoretical model but there is
no such theoretically-justified model for Congress to assign power implicitly to
an agency to interpret an existing regulation that it had itself promulgated.116
Notwithstanding the failure to articulate a convincing theoretical, or legal
explanation for an implicit self-delegation of interpretive power to an agency for
its own regulations and similar to how the Chevron deference model has
evolved, the Court has created a preliminary step to assess whether Congress
intended to delegate implicitly interpretive power to an agency to clarify agency
policy decisions inherent in one of its legislative regulations.117 For instance, in
the Perez decision, the Court identifies situations in which Auer deference is not
appropriate. The Court said, “Auer deference is inappropriate ‘when the
agency’s interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’
or ‘when there is reason to suspect that the agency’s interpretation does not
reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment.’”118
Alternatively, exceptions to Auer deference are accurately portrayed to
address situations when it is unlikely that an agency’s regulatory interpretation
is truly an interpretive rule. For example, the Court created the “parroting
exception” in which, if the Court finds that an agency’s legislative rule merely
parroted the statute, then Auer deference is denied to an agency’s regulatory
interpretation since the interpretation is not of the regulation but of the statute.119
Accordingly, the agency regulatory interpretation is, in fact, likely making new

See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203.
Air Transport Ass’n v. Dep’t of Trans., 900 F.2d 369, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated
on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 944 (1991).
116 Hasen, supra note 30, at 344-45.
117 Perez, 135 U.S. at 1208 n.4 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.
410 (1945)).
118 Id.
119 Gonzales v. Oregon 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (explaining that “[s]imply put, the
existence of a parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the
meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute.”).
114
115
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policy in a gap left by the statute and not clarifying an existing regulation. That
is, the agency regulatory interpretation is not of the regulation but of the statute
and should be subject to the standard of review for statutory interpretations. The
agency, by parroting the statute, failed to use its policymaking skills, which
should have been expressed in its prescriptive reasoning in promulgating the
legislative rule, but instead applied those skills in a subsequent setting to make
policy absent the procedural protections that such policymaking demands.
Auer deference is denied when the reviewing court finds that the interpretive
rule is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”120 First, an
inconsistent interpretation suggests that rather than clarifying an existing policy,
the agency has attempted to create a new regulation without use of notice-andcomment. In Christensen v. Harris,121 the Court attempted to enforce the line
between interpretations and amendments to existing regulations by suggesting
that an interpretation that differs from the clear meaning can be viewed as an
attempt by the agency, “under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de
facto a new regulation.”122 Second, a finding of plainly erroneous indicates that
the court found no logical connection between the regulation and what the
agency says the regulation means. If so, the interpretation is likely to be a new
policy. In each of these situations, deference is unwarranted when a court finds
the agency failed to provide clarification of an existing regulation.
Other recent exceptions to Auer deference have little to do with whether a
court finds an implicit delegation of interpretive power to an agency for its own
regulations. For instance, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,123 the
Court denied Auer deference because the Department of Labor changed its
interpretation of a regulation that resulted in an “unfair surprise” for regulated
parties. Whether there was an implicit delegation of interpretive power is
irrelevant to the reason for the denial of deference. Rather the exception to
deference reflects a concern on the part of the court to ensure that regulated
parties have sufficient notice of the rules that govern them.124
There is little doubt that Auer deference has evolved in a manner patterned
after Chevron deference.125 To expand on this point, Professor Pojanowski
identified two related features describing the modern view of Auer deference.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
Christensen v. Harris, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
122 Id.
123 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2159 (2012) (discussing
the Department of Labor’s change in an interpretation of a regulation identifying employees
that were exempt from statutory requirements regarding overtime pay).
124 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 97.
125 Id. at 90 (“By 2017, Sunstein and Vermeule’s Chevron-inflected justification of
Seminole Rock/Auer is not so much an innovation as a cogent account of the doctrine’s
standard justification.”); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120
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He states,
[f]irst, it understands Seminole Rock/Auer as a kind of Baby Chevron
doctrine; the question is whether and how the Chevron framework
for statutory interpretation should transfer to regulatory
interpretation. Second, it understands Seminole Rock and Auer as
representing a unified doctrine, linking them together both
typologically (with a “/”) and jurisprudentially on the terms of
Chevron.126
Each feature of the conventional wisdom is incorrect. First, the legal theory
that underlies Chevron along with the justifications for judicial deference do not
transfer to the Auer framework.127 Second, Seminole Rock deference is a
fundamentally different doctrine from Auer deference in the type of deference
called for and the reasons justifying a form of deference.128 It is time for the
Court to return to Seminole Rock. To demonstrate this latter point, consider the
view of the deference that was embodied in the original Seminole Rock case.
III. RETURN TO SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE.
The Seminole Rock case involved an interpretation by the Office of Price
Administration (“OPA”), of a regulation that it wrote to implement the directives
contained in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.129 Specifically, the
question at issue centered on the meaning of the regulatory term “Highest price
charged during March, 1942.”130 In resolving the case, the Court announced that
since the legislative rule was determined to be ambiguous, deference should be
given to the regulatory interpretation. The court stated, “the ultimate criterion is
the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”131 Subsequently, the
rule has been interpreted to mean that an agency’s interpretations of its own
regulations are eligible for categorical deference if they satisfy the generous
standard established by the Court in Seminole Rock.132 The Court provided no
legal foundation for the rule but did cite several factors that seemed to contribute
to its holding: (1) the fact that the interpretation was published
contemporaneously with the regulation, (2) agency personnel in the OPA had
published a document that explained in detail how the OPA interpreted the
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 92.
See notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 97.
See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 412 (1945).
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. 413-14.
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regulation’s meaning, and (3) agency personnel had responded in a consistent
manner to regulated parties inquiries regarding how they should go about
complying with the regulation.133 Each of these factors can be viewed as
contributing to the Court’s trust in the agency’s understanding of the intent of
the regulation, a regulation that the same agency personnel had
contemporaneously constructed.
Pojanowski has argued persuasively that the decision in the Seminole Rock
case can be viewed as the application of a judicial standard established by the
Court in the previous year.134 In Skidmore v. Swift Co.,135 the Court addressed
the amount of credence reviewing courts should give to agency statutory
interpretations. Thus, the decision in Seminole Rock can be viewed as a natural
extension of the Court’s recently articulated view of the appropriate standard of
review for agency statutory interpretations to an issue implicating an agency
regulatory interpretation. Under the Skidmore standard, the Court holds final
interpretive authority of a statute or regulation.136 The objective of the court is
to find the correct interpretation of the decisions inherent in the legal text.137
Courts consider agencies to be a potentially highly valued source of knowledge
with respect to identifying the inherent meaning of the text. Nonetheless, the
reviewing court will only give considerable weight to an agency’s interpretation
if the court determines it to be persuasive. In making its decision, a reviewing
court is instructed that “the weight of [the agency’s] judgment . . . will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all the factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”138 In the Mead decision,
the Court reintroduced the Skidmore standard and concluded that it is the default
standard of review for an agency’s statutory interpretation if the court
determines that the interpretation does not qualify for consideration of
categorical deference.139 A similar conclusion should be applied to an agency’s
regulatory interpretations, that an interpretive rule is not the result of an agency
exercising delegated legislative power.
133 Brief of Professors supra note 99, at 17-20; see Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present
and Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in Judicial Rule of Agency
Interpretations of Regulations, 62 KAN. L. REV. 633, 636-37, 639 (2014) (explaining the
deference given to agency interpretations by courts).
134 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 92.
135 Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
136 Id.
137 Contrast this objective to that in Chevron where the agency, using delegated power, is
making law in a gap in a statute because Congress did not resolve the issue. There is no
congressionally-made correct answer to be found but only an interpretation that can
reasonably fill the gap in a text.
138 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
139 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001).
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In considering the weight a court assigns to an agency’s interpretation of a
legal text, the court retains final interpretive authority.140 In contrast to the
Chevron doctrine that provides for the possibility of a grant of categorical
deference (thus, transferring interpretive power from a court to an agency), there
is no need to develop a new legal theory for a doctrine that provides only for the
reviewing court to determine the weight to be given to an agency legal
interpretation. Rather, what is needed is a rationale to justify the weight that a
court should assign to an agency interpretation. In the 1940s, a widely used
approach for conducting textual interpretation focused on discerning the
intentions of the author of the text, such as Congress for a statute, or an agency
for a regulation.141 For instance when considering a regulation created by an
agency, it seems intuitive to give considerable weight to an agency’s view of
what the authors of the regulation intended for it to mean. A reviewing court
would look for signs of authorial reliability or unreliability in deciding how
much weight to give to the agency’s regulatory interpretation.142
At the time of the Seminole Rock case, there was no conception of an
interpretive model that viewed the agency as having relied on congressionally
delegated lawmaking power to make law by filling gaps in ambiguous
regulations. Rather, the agency regulatory interpretation was of probative value
to the extent that it could help the court identify the inherent meaning of a
regulation. One key indicator of a reliable author, that was present in the
Seminole Rock case, is if the regulation and its interpretation were
contemporaneously promulgated.143 On the other hand, as is now quite
frequently the case (e.g., see details of Perez and Christopher cases)144, an
agency purports to clarify the meaning of a regulation that was promulgated
many years prior to the agency interpretation.145 Such a post-promulgation
White, supra note 88, at 353.
Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 92.
142 Id. at 95 (“Under Skidmore, an administrative author’s account need not be decisive:
an author’s hasty, poorly reasoned, inconsistent, or plainly countertextual claim about the
meaning of its legal pronouncement would raise suspicions about the sincerity or reliability
of the narrator.”).
143 Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
144 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015); Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 153 (2012).
145 See Stephen M. DeGenaro, Why Should We Care About An Agency’s Special Insight,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 924 (2014) (“The typical originalist argument emphasizes the
fact that the agency that wrote a regulation has “special insight” into the “original intent” of
the regulation, and that the original intent of the regulation should control its interpretation.
Courts following this reasoning will defer to an agency’s interpretation when the court
determines that the interpretation reflects the agency’s special insight into the regulation’s
meaning—-such as when the agency’s interpretation is made shortly after the regulation is
promulgated, or when the interpretation represents a consistently held view of the agency.”).
140
141
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interpretation is more likely to reflect the political views of the current
administration rather than the original intent of the promulgating agency.146
However, a court is likely to assign less weight to an agency’s noncontemporaneous interpretation if the court is interested in understanding the
original meaning of a regulation when it decides on its regulatory interpretation.
Nevertheless, because under the Skidmore standard, the court is instructed to
consider all factors that have the power to persuade the court, there may be other
factors that indicate to the reviewing court that the current agency’s regulatory
interpretation should be given considerable weight.147 A court should give
serious consideration to all of an agency’s expository reasons (which are the
appropriate kinds of reasons to support an agency’s understanding of the
inherent meaning of a static text). Further, the special insight that the author
possesses given its authorship of the underlying regulation should be considered
as an expository reason that warrants epistemological deference.148 There is no
logical justification for an agency to exercise its purported policymaking
strengths in this purely interpretive endeavor. Instead, the policymaking
strengths, as reflected in prescriptive arguments, are expected to be exercised
when an agency fills gaps in an ambiguous text to promulgate a legislative rule
since there is an absence of already-made law.
Problems critics have with modern Auer deference—such as self-delegation,
unclear regulations, and unfair surprise—stem from the separation of the
doctrine from its historical roots,149 and its subsequent connection with a
Chevron-inspired view of interpretation as an exercise of delegated power to fill
gaps. If the doctrine was returned to its original understanding, the limitations
placed on the modern Auer doctrine can be viewed as denying deference in
situations in which the reviewing court is likely to have found the agency to be
an unreliable source of what the regulation meant.150 For example, when an
146 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984)
(The court has “long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”).
147 Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
148 A reviewing court should also other consider pre-promulgation materials. Sources
that can aid a reviewing court to discern the original meaning of an agency’s regulation
include (a) the statement of basis and purpose (Noah calls this the final preamble), (b)
regulatory analyses, and (c) other published documents. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory
Intent: The Place for a Legislative History of Agency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 260
(2000) (“This Article juxtaposes the contrasting judicial approaches to the interpretation of
statutes and regulations in order to suggest that the courts have got it backwards when they
largely ignore an agency’s original intent in promulgating a legislative rule.”).
149 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 97.
150 Id. (replacing categorical deference with epistemological deference means that an
agency is not given the power of self-delegation. The court holds ultimate authority to
determine the meaning of an ambiguous regulation with the agency’s interpretation likely to
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agency promulgates a regulation that parrots the statute,151 the reliability of the
agency’s interpretation can be questioned since the agency is not the author of
the interpreted text.152 When an agency’s interpretation of a regulation creates
an unfair surprise,153 this raises concerns about the reliability of current agency
in understanding the original, inherent meaning of the regulation.154 Further,
proper use of an interpretive rule should not incorporate the current political
considerations of the current agency to give new meaning to a regulation
promulgated by a previous agency and administration. Flip-flops in interpretive
rules raise exactly this suspicion. Pojanowski concludes that “[i]n fact, by
withholding Auer deference in the context of parroting regulations and unfair
surprise, the Court, as a practical matter, is already backing into its original
approach to Seminole Rock.”155
IV. CONCLUSION.
The APA distinguished between two types of rulemakings, an interpretive
rule, which is an interpretive effort intended to clarify existing law and a
legislative rule, which is the policymaking effort intended to create new law.156
Chevron blurred the conceptual difference between these two efforts in the case
of an agency delegated interpretive power to resolve statutory ambiguities.
However, while “Chevron does not make agency ‘interpretation’ of statutes
binding on the courts, it does require acceptance of agency lawmaking.”157
Courts should retain ultimate interpretive power to clarify a decision that
Congress made in Chevron cases. If a case proceeds to step two, the deference
be given considerably weight when determined by the court to be a reliable source of
meaning).
151 Gonzales v Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special
authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to
formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”).
152 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 98.
153 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156, 158 (2012).
154 Pojanowski, supra note 98, at 95.
155 Id. at 99.
156 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (“The
Administrative Act (APA) establishes the procedures federal administrative agencies use for
‘rule making,’ defined as the process of “formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”); 5
U.S.C. § 551(5). The APA distinguishes between two types of rules: So-called “legislative
rules” are issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking, see §§ 553(b), (c); and have the
“force and effect of law,” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979).
“Interpretive rules,” by contrast, are “issued . . . to advise the public of the agency’s
construction of the statutes and rules which it administers,” Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial
Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995), do not require notice-and-comment rulemaking, and “do
not have the force and effect of law.” Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1201-02.
157 Herz, supra note 25, at 187 n.3, 190.
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step, courts must ensure that the reasoned decision-making requirement is
satisfied. If an agency uses expository reasoning to justify its interpretation of a
statutory ambiguity, it does not deserve categorical deference but should instead
be considered for epistemological deference. In fact, any interpretive effort by
an agency, whether of a statute or a regulation, should not be a candidate for
categorical deference. If resolving legal uncertainty requires technical and
political choices, rather than legal craft, then an agency’s interpretive effort,
which should correctly be called a legislative effort, should be a candidate for
categorical deference. For such a rule, there is no role for modern Auer
deference, only Chevron deference. Unfortunately, a failure to distinguish the
mode of reasoning an agency uses has led to a failure to follow the instructions
Congress provided. This is true in general of the APA and specifically in its
statutory commands to a specific administrative agency.
Although while it might appear that the theory underlying the models for
Chevron deference and Auer deference are similar, they are fundamentally
different. Chevron deference involves agencies, using their superior subject
matter expertise (compared to courts) and congressionally delegated authority to
fill gaps in the statute by making law in the form of legislative rules. In this
scenario, Chevron calls upon courts to give categorical deference to the agency’s
statutory interpretation, which should be expressed through prescriptive
reasoning. Auer deference involves agencies, using their special insight into
understanding the intentions of the promulgator of the regulation, that is, the
agency itself, should be viewed as a convincing source of what an ambiguous
regulation actually means. The agency presents its understanding of the
legislative rule, expressed using expository reasoning and in the form of
interpretive rules, which warrant epistemological consideration from the
reviewing court. Relying on prescriptive reasons to clarify the meaning of an
existing legislative rule is irrational.
This conception of interpretation requires reviewing courts to distinguish
between interpretation and policymaking. This implies that, in practice, there are
some interpretive questions, ambiguous but not indeterminate, that can be
resolved using law finding skills (i.e., legal craft) while others require
lawmaking or policymaking skills. Agencies, by the expression of the actual
kinds of reasons they provide for their interpretive choice and by what they say
they are attempting to achieve with the interpretive choice, warrant
epistemological deference (i.e., Skidmore deference) for regulatory
interpretation questions and categorical deference for statutory interpretation
questions that are supported by prescriptive reasoning. There is neither any place
for nor theoretical justification for Auer deference. Agency interpretive rules
should be subject to a lesser form of deference which matches the original
concept of Seminole Rock deference.
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